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THE SHIFT OF THE BALANCE OF ADVANTAGE IN CRIMINAL
LITIGATION: THE CASE OF MR. SIMPSON
by
DAVID ROBINSON, JR.-
The intense public interest in the extraordinary trial and acquittal of Mr.
O.J. Simpson provides an appropriate occasion to look at the criminal justice
system more generally, to note where we have been in the balance of advan-
tage between prosecution and defense, where we are now, and where, perhaps,
we should be.
In 1923 Judge Learned Hand wrote:
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage .... Our
dangers do not lie in too little tenderness to the accused. Our procedure
has been always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It
is an unreal dream. What we need to fear is the archaic formalism and the
watery sentiment that obstructs, delays, and defeats the prosecution of
crime.'
This "unreal dream" was to become a nightmare. Subsequent to Judge
Hand's observations, the Supreme Court led a revolution in criminal proce-
dure, one which shifted focus from the guilt or innocence of the accused to the
permissibility of the process, irrespective of the guilt of the accused. Crimi-
nal justice decisions became linked to civil rights decisions. The Court em-
ployed expansive readings of constitutional language in both contexts in an
effort to ameliorate the plight of the disadvantaged, particularly members of
racial minority groups. The circumstances of the poor were to be addressed
by assuring more equal education,2 greater voting rights, 3 better access to
public assistance,4 and housing.5
* Professor of Law, George Washington University National Law Center. B.A., Reed
College; J.D., Columbia Law School; LL.M, Harvard Law School. The able research assistance
of Mr. David S. Bloch (J.D., George Washington University National Law Center, 1996) is
gratefully acknowledged.
1. United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (2d Cir. 1923). Judge Hand's view was not a
unanimous one. Citing investigative disadvantages of the defense, Professor Abraham
Goldstein argued that the balance of advantage lay with the prosecution. The State and the
Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960). I have
borrowed part of Professor Goldstein's title to revisit the issue here.
2. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (state segregated education violates
the Equal Protection Clause).
3. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (equal protection requires "one person, one vote"
principle to apply to state legislative districting).
4. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (due process requires pre-termination evidentiary
hearing, including right to confront adverse witnesses, prior to withdrawal of welfare benefits).
5. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (finding no rational
1
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And it was to become more difficult to convict them of crimes. Rather
than concentrating on reducing the possibility of convicting an innocent per-
son, the Supreme Court led an attack on the equity, social utility, and moral
legitimacy of an enterprise that disproportionately sanctioned the oppressed.
What has widely been perceived as an unjust exoneration of O.J. Simpson
provides an opportunity to reflect on some of these changes. They remain as
a part of our constitutional structure today. Among them are the contempo-
rary law of confessions, of search and seizure, of permissible comment on a
defendant's failure to testify in his defense, and the right to trial by jury.
Before the Supreme Court's criminal justice revolution, every effort
would have been made to quickly arrest and interrogate Mr. Simpson at
length, preferably at a police station, before he consulted defense counsel.
The object: a confession or detailed explanatory information, which would
enable the investigation to proceed to quickly verify or contradict his expla-
nations, or to move in other directions. In 1949, Supreme Court Justice Robert
Jackson warned against abandoning these procedures. He cautioned the Court
against holding:
[t]hat the State may not take into custody and question one suspected
reasonably of an unwitnessed murder. If it does, the people of this coun-
try must discipline themselves to seeing their police stand by helplessly
while those suspected of murder prowl about unmolested.6
Despite Justice Jackson's warnings, in the 1960s the Supreme Court
erected a variety of additional constitutional barriers to these processes.7
Picking up a suspect for interrogation was held to be a "seizure" that was
unreasonable in the absence of probable cause and hence a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.8 While the Fourth Amendment was directed to the fed-
eral government, not the states, the Court proceeded to extend it to the latter,9
along with the exclusionary evidence rule that it had previously invented as
basis for ordinance used to deny a permit for a group home for handicapped residents).
6. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 61-62 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
7. See generally H. Richard Uviller, Evidence From the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A
Reconsideration of the Current Rules of Access and Restraint, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1137
(1987).
8. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) (incriminating statements made at police station
following an illegal arrest must be excluded from evidence, even if police issued Miranda
warnings to defendant).
9. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (Fourth Amendment applies to states,
but evidence seized in violation of Fourth Amendment does not render evidence inadmissible
in state prosecution), overruled in part by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
A T
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a limit in federal prosecutions. 0 The Court held that a confession obtained by
such a violation must henceforth be excluded as a "fruit of the poisonous
tree."''
Even if the police avoided making an unreasonable seizure, a person in
custody was held to have the right to a defense attorney at his side during
questioning." The job of the lawyer at a police station, of course, is not to see
that the truth be told; it is to prevent the client from confessing. This new
constitutional right was initially discovered in the Sixth Amendment provi-
sion that the accused was entitled to defense counsel in a "criminal prosecu-
tion.' 3 At the beginning of the 1960s this was widely understood to refer to
counsel during trial. There, a defense attorney can indeed assist in the truth-
seeking process by challenging prosecution evidence and presenting that of
the defense. The Court extended the right to counsel to the interrogation situ-
ation, despite the lawyer's very different function there.' 4 It also expanded
this right to the far larger arena of state prosecutions - as an element of due
process of law, 5- and made counsel for the indigent free.' 6 A confession ob-
tained in violation of this right was held inadmissible.
A third new constitutional barrier to obtaining confessions was erected
in the famous Miranda decision. 7 The Fifth Amendment prohibition against
''compelling" a person to be a "witness against himself" was stretched beyond
its literal and historic application to sworn testimony to apply to the interro-
gation of persons in custody. It too was extended to the states. s Furthermore,
it was enlarged beyond circumstances of compulsion to become a right to
silence whose waiver must be informed by a warning that anything said may
incriminate, and that before responding, the suspect had a right to consult a
lawyer. Only an informed and completely voluntary waiver of these rights
would be valid. In addition, the Court later held that, if the suspect indicated
he would like to talk to an attorney, he was immune from further questioning
by the police about that or any other crime, unless he initiated such question-
10. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1960) (overruling Wolf v. Colorado and applying the
exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) to the states).
11. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
12. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). See also Akhil Reed Amar and Renee B.
Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV.
857 (1995).
13. Massiah, 377 U.S. 201.
14. Id.
15. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
16. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
17. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
18. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
Fall 19961
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ing or counsel had been made available to him. 9
My sense - informed by my own experience as a state and federal pros-
ecutor prior to these changes - is that most persons accused, with probable
cause, of an intra-familial homicide carry such a sense of guilt and remorse
that skilled interrogation - in the absence of obstruction by counsel - has
a strong likelihood of eliciting a confession. Such cases would usually have
been resolved without trial by a guilty plea.
According to news accounts, Mr. Simpson flew to Chicago shortly after
the murders of Nicole Simpson and Ronald Goldman occurred.20 Upon his
return, he consulted his lawyer, Howard Weitzman, who begged him not to
submit to an interview by the police.2" Mr. Simpson rejected this advice, and
as the police were unwilling to talk with him in the normally futile setting of
a defense attorney present, Mr. Simpson spoke with them alone, denying his
guilt.2  This statement was not placed in evidence at the trial. Mr. Weitzman
dropped out of the case soon thereafter, citing his long personal relationship
with Mr. Simpson and the press of other cases.2 3 Mr. Simpson was subse-
quently charged with two counts of murder in the first degree.
The Simpson case is atypical in a variety of respects. A client repre-
sented by counsel ordinarily will not refuse to follow the conventional advice
not to talk to the police. Mr. Simpson presumably hoped that he could con-
vince them not to charge him. He also surely must have had the benefit of
counsel's prior warnings of the danger of making any inculpatory statements.
Furthermore, he was not subject to the psychological pressure of being in
custody, and he was an unusually resourceful, articulate, and self-confident
man.
II
A second area of American procedural change has been in the law of
search and seizure of property, which until the 1960s did not ordinarily result
in suppression of evidence against the accused. To paraphrase Justice
Cardozo, in most states the criminal did not go free because the constable
19. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
20. Josh Meyer & Eric Malnic, O.J. Simpson's Ex-Wife, Man Found Slain, L.A. TIMES,
June 14, 1994, at Al.
21. Henry Weinstein, Talking to Police Limits Defense, Experts Say, L.A. TIMES, June 23,
1994, at A15; Meyer & Malnic, supra note 20, at Al.
22. Henry Weinstein, supra note 21, at A15.
23. See Weinstein, supra note 21, at A15; Jim Newton & Josh Meyer, Blood Matches
Simpson Type, Police Sources Say, L.A. TIMES, June 16, 1994, at Al; Jim Newton & Andrea
Ford, Detective Tells of Trail of Blood at Simpson Home, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1995, at Al.
[Vol. 30:1
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blundered.2 4 In the Simpson case, the police did blunder by not obtaining a
search warrant prior to scaling the fence at his residence.
The law now applicable to obtaining search warrants is intricate. Pro-
fessor Akhil Amar of the Yale Law School recently summarized Supreme
Court search and seizure opinions as "a vast jumble of judicial pronounce-
ments that is not merely complex and contradictory, but often perverse."2 5
Perhaps this discourages police applications for search warrants, which is a
complicated, easily botched, and often time consuming process. If so, the
integrity of the criminal justice process is sometimes further eroded by police
perjury concerning the circumstances of the acquisition of the evidence, in
order to place the case within an exception to the warrant requirement.
The Simpson defense contended that such perjury occurred in connec-
tion with the search that yielded the famous bloody glove inside the fence at
Mr. Simpson's residence. Even in England, as Lord Devlin noted, "[i]t is the
general habit of the police never to admit to the slightest departure from cor-
rectness." 2 6 An implausible account of the basis of the search tends to infect
the plausibility of the testimony on the merits, even though there is every
reason to believe that police witnesses are far more truthful on the latter than
on what they regard as dysfunctional technicalities designed to humiliate
them.
At trial, the Simpson defense made much of the lack of credibility of
Detectives Mark Fuhrman and Philip Vannatter, the two central investigators
in the case. 7 Both testified that they did not consider Simpson a suspect when
they drove to his house from the scene of the crimes shortly after the discov-
ery of the homicides.2 8 The officers claimed they were only worried that there
might be other victims in the Simpson house and that they therefore had not
obtained a warrant, which would have been required to search for evidence of
the crimes.29 Had they testified otherwise, the bloody glove and other evi-
dence uncovered in the search would probably have been suppressed.
24. People v. DeFore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y.) cert. denied 270 U.S. 657 (1926).
25. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994).
26. PATRICK DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 47 (1958).
27. Jim Newton & Andrea Ford, Furhman Tells of His Actions at Scene of Slayings, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 11, 1995, at Al; Jim Newton & Henry Weinstein, Vannatter Offers Explanations
for Glove Questions, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1995, at Al; Newton & Meyer, supra note 23, at
Al.
28. Andrea Ford & Jim Newton, High-Stakes Testimony by Furhman Concludes, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 17, 1995, at AI; Andrea Ford & Jim Newton, Cochran Queries Officer on Simpson's
Reaction, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1995, at Al; Newton & Weinstein, supra note 27, at Al;
Newton & Ford, supra note 23, at A l.
29. Newton & Ford, supra note 23, at Al.
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The prosecution paid a terrible price for this testimony. The detectives
were soeffectively discredited on the witness stand that the defense went out
of its way at the close of its case to have them repeat their versions - given
months before in the trial - of what had happened at the search. 30 At the
conclusion of the case, Judge Ito read to the jury the standard instruction: "A
witness, who is willfully false in one material part of his or her testimony, is
to be distrusted in others."'" The Simpson jury appears to have done so.
III
A third change in the balance of advantage came with the Supreme
Court's decisions forbidding comment by a prosecutor or trial judge on a
defendant's failure to take the witness stand. Prior to 1965, California- pur-
suant to its state constitution - permitted such comment. In Griffin v. Cali-
fornia,3 2 a murder case that eventually went to the United States Supreme
Court, the prosecutor had argued:
The defendant certainly knows whether Essie Mae had this beat up appear-
ance at the time he left her apartment and went down the alley with her
.... He would know how the blood got on the bottom of the concrete
steps ... . These things he has not seen fit to take the stand and deny or
explain. And in the whole world, if anybody would know, this defendant
would know. Essie Mae is dead, she can't tell you her side of the story.
The defendant won't.33
The California trial judge told the jury that a defendant has a right not to
testify, but he added that the jury was entitled to consider the defendant's
failure to deny or explain the prosecution's evidence in its assessment of his
guilt.
The Supreme Court reversed Griffin's conviction, holding that the ad-
verse comments were inconsistent with the federal privilege against self-in-
crimination, a doctrine first extended to the states subsequent to Griffin's
trial.34 While Griffin had not been compelled to testify, the Supreme Court
held that the comments had made his choice costly, and thus implicitly vio-
lated the Constitution. Presumably, the defense in the Simpson case came to
the conclusion that their theory of how the murders occurred would be less
30. Andrea Ford & Jim Newton, Simpson Lawyers Say Vannatter Lied on Stand, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 1995, at Al.
31. COMMITTEE ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL, OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF Los ANGELES COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.212 (5th ed.
1996).
32. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
33. Id. at 610, 611 (1965).
34. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
[Vol. 30:1
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credible if Mr. Simpson testified. He then would have been subject to cross-
examination. While the jury might of its own accord draw adverse inferences
from his failure to testify (although they were explicitly instructed not to
consider or even discuss it), that was preferable to their likely inferences if he
had done so. Under Griffin v. California, his decision not to take the witness
stand was immune from adverse comment in the courtroom. Strangely, it also
largely escaped discussion in the press.
IV
A fourth area of federal constitutional change relates to the right to jury
trial. Although the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to trial by "an impar-
tial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted,' 3 5 it was held inapplicable to the states until 1968.36 Since then, a host of
decisions have sought to enforce jury arrays that are a fair cross-section of the
community. 37 Yet, the huge county of Los Angeles is divided into multiple
California Superior Court districts, and jurors are drawn from the vicinity of
an individual district courthouse, as happened in the Simpson case. 8 One
would have expected the prosecutor to file the charges against Simpson in the
western Los Angeles judicial district where Nicole Simpson and Ronald
Goldman were murdered. A jury impaneled there would likely have been
multi-racial but more significantly white.39 The relative proportion of black
jurors on such a panel would not have been inconsistent with the demograph-
ics of Los Angeles County as a whole, since Los Angeles is only about 11%
black, although it is slightly less than 50% white.40 However, the catastrophic
riots following a largely white jury's acquittal of the police officers involved
in the beating of Rodney King were fresh in the minds of everyone, including
the Los Angeles District Attorney, Mr. Gil Garcetti." These riots left more
than fifty people dead, thousands injured, and nearly one billion dollars in
property damage.4"
35. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
36. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
37. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
38. Andrea Ford & Jim Newton, 12 Simpson Jurors are Sworn In; L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4,
1994, at Al.
39. Tim Rutten & Henry Weinstein, Garcetti's Political Future May Ride on Simpson
Case, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1995, at Al.
40. Henry Weinstein, Simpson Jury Could Defy Conventional Wisdom, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
5, 1994, at Al.
41. Rutten & Weinstein, supra note 39, at Al.
42. Don Colburn, Treating Violence as a Deadly Disease; Federal Health Officials Track
Patterns of Risk in the Wake of the Riots in Los Angeles, WASH. POST, May 19, 1992, at Z6;
Paul Lieberman and Richard O'Reilly, One year After the Riots, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 1993, at
Al.
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Garcetti elected to bring charges in the Central Los Angeles District,
where a primarily African-American jury was more likely to be impaneled.4 3
Rioting by blacks was less probable if such a jury convicted, and presumably
rioting in Beverly Hills and along Rodeo Drive was not to be anticipated if
there was an acquittal.
Polling data, the verdict itself, and the post-verdict celebrations by many
blacks - and expressions of dismay by many whites - suggest that it is likely
this decision was outcome-determinative." This is not to say that people who
sit on a jury simply decide to vote for the local team. While nullification of
obnoxious laws and oppressive prosecutions has a long history in Anglo-
American law,45 here the charge was a particularly gruesome double murder.
The jurors who spoke to the press did not concede nullification. Yet, one must
not put total credence in how jurors explain their reasoning after they have
already rendered their verdict. In part this is because they tend to persuade
themselves that they acted properly.46 Thus, black people have disproportion-
ately come to actually believe that either Mr. Simpson was an innocent man
being framed by racists in the Los Angeles Police Department, or at least that
the evidence against him was too insubstantial to merit a guilty verdict. 7
Another factor is fear. Jurors must return to their homes and places of
employment once their service ends. They and their families are vulnerable
to reprisals, ranging from physical attacks to social ostracism. In a Los An-
geles Times poll, sixty-seven percent of respondents believed that some ac-
quittals in criminal cases tried after the riots in the Rodney King case were
motivated by the jurors' fear for their own safety.48
Reports from various parts of the country indicate that inner-city jurors
are increasingly likely to reject powerful prosecution cases against black
defendants. In 1990, District of Columbia Mayor Marion Barry was charged
43. Henry Weinstein et al., Miscalculations, Bad Luck Hurt Prosecution, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
4, 1995, at Al; Rutten & Weinstein, supra note 39, at Al.
44. See Cathleen Decker, The Simpson Legacy, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1995, at S1; Tony
Perry, The Simpson Verdicts: Snubbing the Law to Vote on Conscience, L.A. Times, Oct. 5,
1995, at AI.
45. See., e.g., Bushnell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P.1670); Perry, supra note 44 , at
A5.
46. Of course, one could argue that exercise of the power of nullification is often proper.
See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995). Acceptance of Professor Butler's thesis would do much
to further the dissolution of the rule of law, particularly in inner-city communities, where the
need for law is most insistent.
47. See Decker, supra note 44, at S 1.
48. Carla Rivera, Majority Says Denny Verdicts Too Lenient, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1993, at
[Vol. 30:1
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with fourteen crimes, including perjury. Despite what United States District
Court Judge Thomas Jackson later described as a trial in which he had "never
seen a stronger government case," the jury convicted on only one count, a mis-
demeanor charge of cocaine possession.49 In the trial over the vicious beat-
ing (including a brick to the temple) of prostrate white truck driver Reginald
Denny following the Rodney King case acquittals, Damian Monroe Williams
was acquitted of attempted murder, despite a videotape of his attack." On the
other side of the continent, a Brooklyn jury acquitted Lemrick Nelson, Jr. of
fatally stabbing Yankel Rosenbaum, a young Australian Jew who had come
to New York to study the Holocaust, and found his own. Nelson had been
quickly apprehended by police, identified by the dying Rosenbaum, had a
bloody knife in his pocket (DNA analyzed as consistent with the victim's
blood), and confessed to the stabbing. After the acquittal, some members of
the jury reportedly feted Mr. Nelson at a dinner hosted by defense counsel."
In the Bronx - where juries are overwhelmingly black and Hispanic - black
defendants are acquitted in almost half of the felony trials, nearly three times
the average rate of acquittals nationwide.5 2 Detroit and Washington, D.C. also
report high acquittal rates.53
Of course, statistically non-representative juries can be chosen in any
random selection drawing.54 Traditionally, parties have often exercised pe-
remptory challenges where the characteristics of the pool of prospective ju-
rors make replacing some jurors tactically profitable. Exercising
peremptories involves a good deal of conjecture, and superficial aspects of a
juror's appearance and personality are necessarily given weight. One such
factor is the similarity of a prospective juror to a party and dissimilarity to the
opposing party (or victim).5 5 However, in 1986, the Supreme Court abruptly
limited this practice by holding that such challenges violate a defendant's
right to equal protection when exercised on the basis of race.56 Thus, the
49. Christopher B. Daly, Barry Judge Castigates Four Jurors, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1990,
at Al; Michael York & Tracy Thompson, Barry Sentenced to Six Months in Prison, WASH.
POST, Oct. 27, 1990, at Al.
50. Edward J. Boyer & John J. Mitchell, Attempted Murder Acquittal, Deadlock Wind Up
Denny Trial, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1993, at AI; Edward J. Boyer & Andrea Ford, Williams
Given Maximum 10 Years in Denny Beating, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1993, at Al; Eric Malnic,
Last Defendant in Denny Case Gets Probation, L.A. TIMES, July 9, 1994, at B3.
51. Eric Breindel, Race and Riots in New York, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 1992, at A16.
52. Id.
53. John Leo, The Color of the Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 16, 1995, at 24.
54. Robert L. Shapiro, one of Simpson's lead lawyers, described the non-representative
jury that was chosen as "just the luck of the draw." Ford & Newton, supra note 23, at AI.
55. THOMAS A. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 32 (1980).
56. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) overruling Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202
(1965).
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prosecution in the Simpson case was precluded from exercising its peremp-
tory challenges to obtain ajury more representative of the population of Los
Angeles. It used only ten of its twenty available peremptories.57
Our traditional jury trial system was developed in a more racially homo-
geneous context, concerned at the outset with erecting a barrier to Royal in-
terference with colonial trials. In the wake of the Simpson verdict, it is natural
that some may wish to consider alternatives, such as a trial by court or by a
professional judge sitting in collaboration with a very small number of lay
judges, as is the practice of some European countries. Trials to judges are far
more expeditious, and professional judges have more experience in handling
complicated testimony, such as that presented in the Simpson case.
Yet, while providing an interesting subject for speculation, replacing the
jury as we know it is not a realistic possibility. This type of change would now
require federal as well as state constitutional amendments.58 Furthermore,
substituting judges for juries would not be a panacea. Most American trial
court judges obtain their position through their political talents and connec-
tions, not their legal acumen, their skills at fact-finding, or their judiciousness.
Compensation levels, which are far below that of many attorneys in private
practice, are an additional disincentive to recruiting the most able members
of the legal profession. In addition, most state judges serve for fixed terms and
are subject to the pressures of reelection. In short, the American judiciary is
highly variable in its quality, and its impartiality might be particularly suspect
in a case such as that of Mr. Simpson.
There is also much to be said for the sort of community group judgment
that a jury provides, particularly where the substantive law standards are
necessarily vague, as they are in distinguishing degrees of homicide, the capi-
tal punishment issue, the consent question in rape, and various defenses, such
as insanity and self-defense. Occasionally there is also the problem of ill-
57. It was also reported that the lead prosecutor, Marcia Clark, disregarded polling data
showing especially strong support for the defendant among black women, Clark relied on her
instincts that concern about spouse abuse would prevail over feelings about race. She dismissed
the contrary advice of jury consultant Donald Vinson, whose research showed that most
African American women saw Simpson as a symbol of black male success. See POSTMORTEM:
THE O.J. SIMPSON CASE 8 (Jeffrey Abramson ed., 1996); Lorraine Adams & Serge F.
Kovaleski, The Best Defense Money Could Buy; Well-Heeled Simpson Legal Team Seemed
One Step Ahead All Along, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1995, at Al. Vinson's pretrial research also
suggested that the pro-Simpson attitude of black women jurors was likely to be unchanged by
any conceivable circumstantial evidence of his guilt. Jeffrey Toobin, The Marcia Clark
Verdict, NEW YORKER, Sept. 9, 1996, at 58, 62. On the other hand, the defense jury selection
strategy was guided by the similar findings of their jury consultant, Jo-Ellan Dimitrius. Id.
(noting that eight of the twelve Simpson jurors were black women).
58. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (federal right to jury trial applicable in
state prosecutions).
[Vol. 30:1
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considered criminal proscriptions enacted by legislatures, often under inter-
est group pressures. We should hesitate to labor to discard the protections of
the jury trial system unless we are convinced that we can do better.
This does not mean that what we have cannot be improved. Juries can
be drawn from broader and more diverse populations than was evidenced in
the Simpson case. Federal courts do so. Excuses often presented by highly
qualified potential jurors to avoid serving can be less readily accepted. Una-
nimity should not be required to return a verdict. Two states, Oregon and
Louisiana, have long permitted non-unanimous verdicts in felony cases, pro-
viding ten of twelve (Oregon) or nine of twelve (Louisiana) concur. 9 This
practice makes hung juries - the result many observers predicted in the
Simpson trial prior to the disclosures of the shocking racial views of Detec-
tive Mark Fuhrman - significantly less likely.
Juries function best when the trial is conducted before an able and vig-
orous judge. This requires a high level of care in assigning judges to espe-
cially difficult cases, care that was not reflected in the selection of the inad-
equate publicity seeker, Judge Lance Ito. Informed observers were appalled
at the glacial pace of the Simpson trial. Even the jury complained. 60 An ef-
fective judge could have completed it in a fractictn of the time. In doing so,
such ajudge might properly have precluded televising the proceedings, which
encouraged the major participants to address the television audience in addi-
tion to performing their responsibilities in the courtroom.
A final observation and suggestion. In the Anglo-American jury trial
tradition, judges were not mere umpires and reciters of abstract principles of
law. They also summarized the evidence and commented upon its probative
force. Edmund Burke long ago observed:
Juries are taken promiscuously from the mass of the people; they are
composed of men who in many instances, in most perhaps, were never
concerned in any causes, judicially or otherwise, before the time of their
service. They have generally no previous preparation or possible knowl-
edge of the matter to be tried; and they decide in a space of time too short
for any nice or critical disposition. These Judges, therefore, of necessity
must forestall the evidence where there is a doubt on its competence, and
indeed observe much on its credibility, or the most dreadful consequences
might follow. The institution of juries, if not thus qualified, could not
exist.
61
59. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (upholding Oregon's practice of permitting
10-2 jury convictions); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) (upholding Louisiana's 9-
3 jury convictions).
60. See Henry Weinstein & Tim Rutten, TV, Legal Wrangling Bog Down Simpson Trial,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1995, at Al.
61. Edmund Burke's Report on Warren Hastings' Trial, 31 Par]. Hist. 357) (Report to the
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As a sometimes visitor to the Old Bailey, the Central Criminal Court in
London, I have been struck with the careful notes taken by British judges
during the course of a trial, and with the extensive and helpful summary of the
evidence - along with comments on its significance - at the trial's conclu-
sion. In most American courtrooms, our populist tradition precludes such
summary and comment, and the jury is simply read standard, abstract instruc-
tions on the applicable law. This development was regarded by Professor
Wigmore as having "[d]one more than any other one thing to impair the gen-
eral efficiency of jury trial as an instrument of justice. ' 62 Even in the minor-
ity of American jurisdictions where the traditional, common law authority of
judges ostensibly continues (including the California and the federal courts),
judges risk reversal if their comments are later regarded as unfair or as infring-
ing on the independence of the jury. 63 The result is that instruction from
American judges tend to be as abstract and relatively unhelpful to juries, as
was Judge Ito's to his. In light of the massive prosecution case, the shockingly
short period of deliberation and the simplistic comments of some of the jurors
following the verdict indicate that wise assistance in this long and complex
trial was sorely needed.
As the Supreme Court has made the character of state jury trials a mat-
ter of federal constitutional concern, a return to the common law tradition of
summary and comment would present additional opportunities for defense
counsel to challenge convictions in federal courts. A body of doctrine pre-
serving the ultimate power of juries to decide the facts of the case and affirm-
ing that the judge's comments are advisory and not binding would have to be
recognized, while accommodating an enhanced judicial guiding role. This
would be no small task. But one consequence might be to attract more able
people to a process that would challenge them to judicial service, a result
which could only be salutary over the long term in the continuing evolution
of our system of criminal justice.
Even if all of these suggestions were adopted, prosecuting crime is likely
to continue to become a more difficult task. The continuing and progressive
disintegration of the American family, the decline of the schools and of many
churches, the increase in drug-related and simply random murders, and the
demographic projections all point to a virtual certainty of sharply increasing
rates of violent crime in the future. Traditional acquaintance or family homi-
cides are the more easily prosecuted, but they are sharply declining as a per-
House of Commons, 1794), part 7, supp. p. xliii (Debrett's ed. 1796), quoted in 9 JOHN H.
WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §2551 (Chadbourn Rev. 1981).
62. WIGMORE, supra note 61, at §2551.
63. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466 (1933) (comment by federal trial judge must be
"fair").
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centage of the total. 64 Other homicides today are frequently simply unsolved,
the motive unknown, the witnesses unwilling to identify themselves or intimi-
dated from testifying if they do so. Assuming the preservation of our insti-
tutional commitments to civil liberties, sound measures to address the present
balance of advantage in the prosecution of criminal cases can only be of as-
sistance on the margins. But we must do what we can.
64. Pierre Thomas, The New Face of Murder in America, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1995, at
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